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Preface 
This book offers an introduction to some centrai legal and philosophical 
issues concerning criminalliability. lt flows from the belief that, in this as 
in many other contexts, lawyers and philosophers have much to learn from 
each other: my hope is that students of law will be able to see the relevance 
to their concerns of philosophical work in the philosophy of action; and 
that students of philosophy will be able to see the relevance to their 
concerns of legal materials and legal discussions. 
I have tried to keep the book (relatively) brief: this means that I have had 
to ignore many issues; to leave many arguments underdeveloped; and to 
make only passing gestures towards various matters which really deserve a 
much fuller treatment. I have also tried to make it (relatively) introductory: 
which means that, while some of the arguments are admittedly fairly 
taxing, I have tried to avoid presupposing any knowledge of either philoso-
phy or the law. For the same reason, I have not tried to refer to all the 
cases and materials that could usefully have been cited: I have, I hope, 
acknowledged my debts to the published work of others; beyond that, I 
have simply suggested a small amount of further reading on the various 
topics which I discuss. 
I owe thanks t o many people: especially to colleagues an d students a t 
Stirling on whom I have tried out many of my id!!aS and who have 
provided a friendly and encouraging intellectual environment in which to 
work; to Andrew Ashworth and Edward Griew, who encouraged my early 
efforts in this area; to Gordon Graham and Tony Ellis, who suggested that 
I should write this book and offered both patient support and constructive 
criticisms; to Roger Shiner, who has been a constant source of stimulating 
ideas and arguments. I owe a special debt to Murray MacBeath and 
Michael Menlowe, who commented in detail and very helpfully on earlier 
drafts of the book - even if I have not always accepted their suggestions 
or followed their advice. But my greatest debt is to Sandra Marshall: I 
discussed every aspect of the book with her; and she has provided, 
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throughout the ( over- )long process of its writing, incalculable philoso-
phical and moral support. 
I. have m~de some use of (but have not simply reproduced) materia! from 
vanous aruc:les: 'Implied and Constructive Malice in Murder' (1979) 95 
~aw Quarteriy Revzew 418; 'Intention, Mens Rea, and the Law Commis-
swn Report' (1980) Criminai Law Review 147; 'Recklessness' (1980) Cri-
mmai Law Revzew 282; 'lntention, Recklessness, an d Probable Conse-
quences' (1980) Criminai Law Rev~ew 404; 'Recklessness and Rape' (1981) 
Lzverpooi Law Revzew 49; 'lntenuon, Responsibility and Double Effect' 
(1982) Phiiosophicai Quarteriy l; 'Caidwell and Lawrence: The Retreat 
from Subjectivism' · (1983) Oxford ]ournai of Legai Studies 77· 'The 
Obscure ln~entions of the House of Lords' (1986) Criminai La w Review 
771; _'lntent:ons ~e?al an~ P.hilosophical' (1989) Oxford journai of Legai 
Stu~z.es 7~;. Cod1fymg ~nmmal Fault: Conceptual Problems and Presup-
posmons m I._H. Denms (ed.), Crzmmai Law & justice (1987) 93. I am 
grateful to Bas1l Blac~w~ll (publish~r of the Phiiosophicai Quarterly ), De-
Gorah C ha~ l es .Pubhcatwns (pubhsher of the Liverpooi Law Review ), 
Oxford Umvers1ty Press (publisher o~ the Oxford Journai of Lega! Stu-
dzes), and Sweet & Maxwell Ltd (pubhshers of the Criminal Law Review 
the Law Q~arteriy ~eview and Criminai Law and]ustice), for permissio~ 
to re-use th1s matenal. 
R.A. Duff 
1989 
T ab le of Cases 
Ahlers [1915] 1 K.B. 616. 
Anderton v Ryan [1985] A.C. 560. 
Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch. 449. 
Attorney-General for Northern 
Ireland's Reference [1977] A.C. 
105 . 
. Bashir [1983] 77 Cr.App.R. 59. 
Beatty v Gillbanks [1882] 9 Q.B.D. 
308. 
Be/fon [1976] 1 W.L.R. 741. 
Blaue [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1411. 
Breckenridge [1984] 79 Cr.App.R. 
244. 
Bush v Commonwealth [1880] 78 
Ky 268 (Kentucky Court of 
Appeal). 
Caldwell [1982] A.C. 341. 
Carmichael [1930] 22 Cr.App.R. 
142. 
Cawthorne [1968] J.C. 32 (Scottish 
Court of Justiciary). 
Charlson [1955] 1 W.L.R. 317. 
Cogan [1976] Q.B. 217. 
Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 K.B. 
237. 
Desmond, Barrett & Others [1868] 











4-6, 29, 34, 103, 114, 140, 145-9, 
150-1, 153, 154, 159, 161, 164-7, 
173, 206 
186 




17, 38, 44, 56 
74 
Table of Cases Xl 
DPP v Smith [1960] A.C. 290. 
Elliott v C (a minor) [1983] 
1 W.L.R. 939. 
Faulkner [1877] 13 Cox C.C. 550. 
Foy [1960] Qd.R. 225. 
Gillick (v W. Norfolk & Wisbech 
Area H e alt h Authority) [1986 J 
A.C. 112. 
Gollins v Gollins [1964] A.C. 644. 
Hancock & Shankland [1986] A.C. 
455. 
Hardie [1985] l W.L.R. 64. 
Hardy v Motor Insurers' Bureau 
[1964] 2 Q.B. 745. 
Hensler[1870J 11 Cox C.C. 570. 
Hills v Ellis [1983] l Q.B. 680. 
Hunter [1974] Q.B. 95. 
Hyam [1975] A.C. 55. 
Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] l Q.B. 
527. 
]ordan [1956] 40 Cr.App.R. 152. 
Khan [1990] The Times, February 
3. 
Kimber [1983] 77 Cr.App.R. 225. 
Lawrence [1982] A.C. 510. 
Lynch [1975] A.C. 653. 
Millard & Vernon [1987] Criminal 
Law Review 393. 
Miller & Denovan (Glasgow High 
Court 1960) Gordon p. 7 41. 
Mohan [1976] Q.B. 1. 
Moloney [1985] A.C. 905. 
Morgan [1976] A.C. 182. 
Murphy [1980] Q.B. 434. 
National Coal Board v Gamble 
[1959] l Q.B. 11. 
Nedrick [1986] l W.L.R. 1025. 
91, 150 
146, 148, 164 
164-5 
122 
20, 61-2, 85-7 
28 






1-3, 4, 15-18,20,21,22, 24, 28, 
35, 53, 80, 89, 96, 98, 103, 114, 





106, 140, 145, 165, 166-7 
19,29, 44-5,53,95 
193 
157-8, 162-4, 174 
4, 18-19, 53, 193, 197 
18,20-2,23,24,28,29, 30,31, 32, 
35, 40, 53, 68, 80-2, 91, 166, 179 




24-5, 26, 68, 80 
Xli Table of Cases 
Nielson [1976 J The Times, June 
15-16,18,23-26, 29,July l, 
6-7, 10, 15-17,20-21. 
Nock [1978] A.C. 979. 
Osborn [1920] 84 J.P. 63. 
Pagett [1983] 75 Cr.App.R. 279. 
Pigg [1982] l W.L.R. 762. 
Satnam & Kewal (1983] 78 
Cr.App.R. 149. 
Sheppard [1981] A.C. 394. 
Shimmen (Chief Constable of Avon 
& Somerset v Shimmen) [1987] 84 
Cr.App.R. 7. 
Shivpuri [1987] A.C. l. 
Smith [1959] 2 Q.B. 35. 
Southern Portland Cement v 
Cooper [1974] 2 W.L.R. 152. 
Steane [1947] KB 997. 
Stephen Maleo/m R [1984] 79 
Cr.App.R. 334. 
Thomas [1983] 77 Cr.App.R. 63. 
Whybrow [1951] 35 Cr.App.R. 141. 













22, 92-5, 205 
147 
149 
4, 197, 203 
151 
T ab le of Statutes 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 
Criminal Justice Act 1967 
Defence (Generai) Regulations 1939 
Firearms Act 1968 
Food and Drugs Act 1955 
Hea!th an d Safety a t W ork etc. A et 
1974 
Homicide Act 1957 
Offences against the Person Act 
1861 
Police Act l 964 
Prevention of Crime Act 1953 
Road Traffic Act 1988 
Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 
Sexual Offences Act 1956 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976 
Theft Act 1968 
3, 39, 117, 180, 181, 184, 193 
















I have used the following abbreviations for frequently cited works in the 
text an d footnotes: 
C&K C.M.V. Clarkson and H.M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984. 
E & W Elliott and Wood's Casebook on Criminal Law; 4th edition by 
D .W. Elliott and C. Wells, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982. 
Gordon G.H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd edition, Edin-
burgh, W. Green & Son, 1978. 
S&H ].C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 6th edition, London, 
Butterworths, 1988. 




1.1 Cases and Questions 
Hyam (1974) 
Mrs Hyam's affair with Mr Jones was over, and he was now attached to 
Mrs Booth. At 2 o'clock one morning, she poured petrol through the 
letterbox of Mrs Booth's house, set light to the petrol and went home 
without raising the alarm. The ensuing fire killed Mrs Booth's two daugh-
ters, and Mrs Hyam was charged with their murder. Sh~ h.ad realized, she 
admitted, that her action was very dangerous to those ms1de the house -
that it might well cause death or serious injury. ~ut she di? not, she 
insisted, intend to kill or injure them; she intended s1mply to fnghten Mrs 
Booth into leaving town, thus separating her from Mr Jones. So was she 
guilty of murder?
1 
. . • . , . 
English law had tradltlonally defined murder as unlawful k1llmg wlth 
malice aforethought'. Now 'malice aforethought', as a term of legai art, 
need involve neither 'malice' in its ordinary extra-legai sense, nor pre-
meditation: but what does it involve? Unti! 1957, it could amount to an 
intention to kill ('express malice'); an intention to cause grievous bodily 
harm ('implied malice'); or an intention to commi~ a viol~nt felo~y ('con-
structive mali ce'): o ne w ho caused death by an acuo n wh1ch was mtended 
to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm, or in the course of a vi?lent 
felony, was guilty of murder. But the Homicide Act 1957 had abohshed 
'constructive mali ce', an d Hyam raised two questions about the post-1957 
law of murder: first, what must an agent 'intend' if she is to be guilty of 
murder; and second, what does 'intention' mean in the criminallaw? 
The trial judge told the jury that Mrs Hyam was guilty of murder if she 
1 See A.J. Kenny, ' lntention and mens rea in murder'; TCL, pp. 251-4; C&K, 
pp. 486-500. 
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'intended to (kill or) do serious bodily harm'; and that she had that 
intention if, when she started the fire, 'she knew that it was highly prob-
able that this would cause ( death or) serious bodily harm' (p. 65): the 
doctrine of implied malice was stili part of the law; and an agent intends 
whatever she foresees as a highly probable consequence of her action. 
. On the basis of that direction, Mrs Hyam was convicted of murder, 
smce she did realize that her action might weli cause serious bodily harm. 
But the defence appealed, arguing that foresight of bodily harm as even a 
highly pr~bable consequence of my action dici not amount to intending to 
cause bod!ly harm; and that the Homicide Act had anyway abolished both 
'constructive' and 'implied' malice, so that murder now required an inten-
tion to kill or to endanger life. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the judge's direction and Mrs Hyam's 
conviction. An intention to cause serious bodily harm stili sufficed for 
murder; and while in ordinary language 'intention' involved 'aim' or 'pur-
pose', and not mere foresight of consequences, in law foresight of death or 
grievous bodily harm as a highly probable consequence of one's action 
constituted the 'intention' necessary for murder. 
The House of Lords also upheld her conviction, by a 3:2 majority, but 
expressed divergent opinions. On the meaning of 'intention', Lord Diplock 
argued that in law an agent intends what she foresees as the likely con-
sequences of her actions. Lord Cross and Viscount Dilhorne thought 
that foresight of a probable (Lord Cross) or highly probable (Viscount 
Dilhorne) consequence might constitute intention, both in ordinary lan-
guage and in law; and that such foresight of the relevant consequence, 
w~ether or not it constituted intention, anyway sufficed to make the agent 
gu1lty of murder. Lord Hailsham, however, insisted that murder required 
an appropriate intention, and that intention is distinct 'from foresight of 
the probable consequences': I intend that which I decide to bring about -
though this includes the means to my end, and the 'inseparable consequ-
ences' of that end (p. 7 4 ). 
On the question of just what the murderer must intend or foresee, Lord 
Diplock and Lord Kilbrandon would have acquitted Mrs Hyam. The 
doctrine of implied malice had been (rightly) abolished: a murderer, 'if he 
dici not intend to kill, must have intended or foreseen as a likely conse-
quence of his act that human life would be endangered' (p. 93, Lord Dip-
lock); an intention to cause grievous bodily harm was sufficient only if 
'grievous bodily harm means some injury which is likely to cause death' (p. 
98, Lord Kilbrandon). Lord Hailsham thought otherwise. An intention to 
cause any 'really serious' (which need not mean 'life-threatening') injury 
sufficed for murder; so too d id an intenti o n to expose others to a serious 
risk of death or serious injury: since Mrs Hyam acted with the latter 
lntroduction 3 
intention, she was rightly convicted. Viscount Dilhorne agreed that she was 
guilty of murder: an intention to cause really serious injury sufficed for 
murder; and Mrs Hyam's awareness that her action might well cause death 
or serious injury constituted such an intention. Lord Cross would say oply 
that if an intention to cause serious injury sufficed for mv.rder, Mrs Hyam 
was rightly convicted: but this conditional opinion tipped the balance 
against her. 
Hyam raises severa! issues. Should murder require an 'intention' to kill; 
or should an intenti o n to cause serious injury (or to expose others to a 
serious risk of death or of serious injury) suffice? What should 'intention' 
mean in the criminal law: do I 'intend' whatever I foresee as a likely or 
(highly) probable consequence of my action, or is something more that 
such foresight required; if so, what is that 'more'? If intention is distinct 
from foresight of likely or probable consequences, why should murder 
require intention, rather than such foresight: why should a person not be 
guilty of murder if he causes death by doing what he knows is likely to 
cause death (or serious injury), whether or not he intends that conse-
quence? 
Cawthorne (1968) 
After a domestic quarrel, Mr Cawthorne fired severa! shots into a room 
where his mistress and three friends had taken refuge from him. No one 
was killed (one person was slightly injured); but he was charged under 
Scots law with attempted murder.2 
The defence argued that, although he had acted with an 'utter and 
wicked recklessness' which would have made him guilty of murder had he 
actually kilied someone, attempted murder required an intention to kill -
which he certainly lacked. The Court of Justiciary rejected this claim: 
attempted murder, said Lord Clyde, 'is just the same as murder in the eyes 
of our law, but for the one vita! distinction, that the killing has not been 
brought off' (p. 36); and Lord Guthrie quoted Alison to the effect that 'a 
ruthless intent, and an obvious indifference as to the sufferer, whether he 
live or die, is to be held as equivalent to an actual attempt to inflict death' 
(p. 38). A person who would be guilty of murder if he caused death is 
guilty of attempted murder if he does not actually cause death. 
This Scottish decision is at odds with English law: under s. 1(1) of the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 I am guilty of attempting to commit an 
offence only if I act 'with intent' to commit that offence. I am guilty of 
2 See G.H . Gordon, 'Cawthorne and the mens rea of murder'; Gordon, pp. 
263-7. 
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murder if I kill someone whom I intended only to injure severely: if I do 
not actually cause death, however, I am guilty of attempted murder only if 
I acted with the intention of causing death. I am guilty of wounding under 
s. 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 if I wound someone 
either intentionally or recklessly; but if I do no t actually cause a wound, .I 
am guilty of attempted wounding only if I intended to wound. 
But why should a criminal attempt require an intention to commit the 
complete offence, if the complete offence itself need involve no such 
intention? According to the English Court of Appeal in Whybrow, 
It may be said that the law, which is not always logica!, is somewhat illogica! 
in saying that if one attacks a person intending to do grievous bodily harm 
and death results, that is murder, but that if . .. death does not result, it is 
not attempted murder .... It is not really illogica! because, in that particular 
case, the intent is the essence of the crime. (p . 147) 
But why is the intent the 'essence' of an aitempted crime? Why should 
the chance fact that Mr Cawthorne did not kill anyone save him from a 
conviction not just for murder, but even for attempted murder? 
Furthermore, what does 'intent' mean here? Two years after Hyam, the 
Court of Appeal held that foresight of bodily harm as a likely or (highly) 
probable consequence of my action could not constitute the 'intention' 
needed for an attempt to cause bodily harm; whatever Hyam decided for 
the case of murder, criminal attempts require a 'specific intent' which must 
involve 'a decision to bring about, in so far as it lies within the accused's 
power, the commission of the offence which it is alleged the accused 
attempted to commit, no matter whether the accused desired that conse-
quence of his act or not' (Mohan, p. 11). This implies that, while a broader 
notion of intention which includes foresight of likely or probable conse-
quences might be appropriate in other criminal contexts (such as murder), 
the concept must be defined more narrowly in the law of attempts. But 
why should this be so: why should 'intention' not have the same meaning 
throughout the criminallaw? And what is a 'specific intent', or a 'decision 
to bring about' a specified consequence, if it is something more than 
foresight of that consequence, but need not involve a 'desire' for it? 
Caldwell (1981) 
Mr Caldwell quarrelled with a hotel owner for whom he had been work-
ing; one night, when drunk, he set fire to the hotel in revenge. The fire was 
extinguished without serious damage to the hotel or any injury to the hotel 
guests: but he was charged with intentionally or recklessly damaging 
property (under s. 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971), and with the 
more serious offence of damaging property with intent to endanger !ife or 
being reckless as to whether !ife would be endangered (under s. 1(2) of the 
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Act). He pleaded guilty to the first offence, but not guilty to the second: he 
did not intend to endanger !ife; and since he was so drunk at the time that 
it did not occur to him that he might be endangering the lives of those in 
the hotel, he was not, he argued, reckless as to whether !ife would be 
endangered. 3 
At his trial, and in the Court of Appeal, everyone agreed that criminal 
recklessness normally requires conscious risk-taking: I am reckless as to the 
harm my action might cause only if I realize that such harm might ensue; if 
I am unaware of that risk of harm I am at worst negligent, not reckless as 
to that harm. As an exception to this generai rule, however, one whose 
unawareness of the risk his action creates is due to self-induced intoxica-
tion can sometimes be held reckless as to that risk; and what concerned the 
lower courts in Caldwell was whether this was true of an offence under s. 
1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act. But neither this issue, nor the grounds 
on which the House of Lords held that Mr Caldwell should be acquitted 
on the s. 1(2) charge, concern us now; our concern is with the Law Lords' 
understanding of the centrai notion of recklessness. For by a 3:2 majority 
the House of Lords rejected the view that recklessness normally requires 
conscious risk-taking: a person is 'reckless' as to whether property will be 
destroyed or damaged if 
(1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be 
destroyed or damaged and (2) when he does the act he either has not given 
any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised 
that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it. 
(p. 354, Lord Diplock) 
Recklessness as to whether !ife would be endangered should be understood 
in the same way. 
This ruling was vigorously attacked by critics who believe that reckless-
ness should involve an actual awareness that my action might cause the 
harm as to which I am said to be reckless (and who thought that the courts 
had finally accepted this view). Lord Edmund-Davies expressed this view 
in his dissenting judgment: unlike negligence, he said, 'recklessness in-
volves foresight of consequences' (p. 358). 
The main question raised by Caldwell is thus whether recklessness 
should be defined as conscious risk-taking; or am I 'reckless' as to some 
harm if I fai! 'to give any thought' to the obvious risk that my action might 
cause that harm? But we must also ask why the criminallaw should be thus 
concerned with recklessness. Why should the s. 1(2) offence not require an 
intention to endanger !ife? Alternatively, why should even recklessness be 
3 See G. Williams, 'Recklessness redefined'; G. Syrota, 'A radica! change in the 
law of recklessness?'; S&H, pp. 61-8. 
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needed; why should it not be enough that the defendant negligently en-
. dangered !ife in damaging property? 
Morgan (1975) 
A related issue about the nature of recklessness arose six years earlier. Mr 
Morgan invited three friends to have sexual intercourse with his wife. He 
told them, they claimed, 'to expect some show of resistance' on her part, 
'but that they need not take this seriously since it was a mere pretence 
whereby she stimulated her own sexual excitement' (p. 186): so they 
forcibly overcame her (in fact genuine) resisrance in the honest, though 
admittedly unreasonable, belief that it was merely play-acting - that she 
really consented to intercourse with them.4 . 
They were convicted of rape after the trial judge held that rape requires 
an intention 'to have intercourse with this woman without her consent' (p. 
187), and that their alleged belief in her consent could acquit them only if it 
was based on reasonable grounds. The Court of Appeal upheld this direc-
tion, rejecting the defence argument that a man who believes (however 
unreasonably) that a woman consents does not intend 'to have intercourse 
without her consent'. Proof that the woman did not consent to intercourse 
creates a presumption that the defendant realized that fact; he can rebut 
that presumption, and secure an acquittal, only by showing that he had 
reasonable grounds for his alleged belief that she did consent. 
The House of Lords rejected this argument by a 3:2 majority, and held 
that one who has intercourse in the honest (though unreasonable) belief 
that the woman consents is not gui!ty of rape. Rape does not merely 
involve having intercourse with a woman who does not in fact consent: it 
requires an intention either to have intercourse without her consent (i.e. 
realizing that she does not consent) or 'to have intercourse nolens volens, 
that is recklessly and not caring whether the victim be a consenting party 
or not' (p. 209, Lord Hailsham); and one who believes, however unreason-
ably, that she consents does not act with either of those intentions. 
Lord Edmund-Davies, one of the two dissenting voices, agreed that this 
was what the law ought to hold, but felt bound to find that as the law 
actually stood, a defendant must cite a reasonable belief in consent to 
secure an acquittal. Only Lord Simon thought that the law should demand 
a reasonable belief in consent: 
[a] woman who has been ravished would hardly feel that she was vindicated 
by being to!d that her assailant must go unpunished because he believed, 
4 See the Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape; E.M. Curley, 
'Excusing rape'; A.J. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility, pp. 57-63. 
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quite unreasonably, that she was consenting to sexual intercourse with him . 
(p. 221) 
7 
The Law Lords upheld the defendants' convictions in Morgan; for their 
claim to have believed that Mrs Morgan consented was clearly untrue. But 
later that year, in Cogan, the defendant was acquitted of rape on the basis 
of a similar claim that his victim's husband had persuaded him into the 
admittedly quite unreasonable belief that she consented to intercourse with 
him. 
According to Morgan, a man is gui!ty of rape only if he knows that the 
woman does not consent or is reckless as to whether she consents; and if 
he believes, however unreasonably, that she consents he is not reckless as 
to whether she consents. But should we agree that a man who persists with 
intercourse in the utterly unreasonable belief that the woman consents is 
not reckless as to her consent? Why, anyway, should rape be defined (as 
the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 defines it) to require either 
knowledge of or recklessness as to the womah's non-consent? Why should 
not conviction for a crime as serious as rapt require knowledge that the 
woman does not consent? Alternatively, why should we not convict of 
rape anyone who has intercourse with a woman who does not in fact 
consent to it, whether or not he realizes that she might not be consenting; 
or require only negligence, rather than recklessness, as to her consent as a 
basis for conviction? 
These four cases raise problems concerning 'mens rea', or 'the ment~l 
element in crime'. 
1.2 Actus Reus and Mens Rea 
'Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea' runs the traditional maxim: an act 
does not make a person guilty unless his mind is also gui!ty. Mrs Hyam's 
act caused death; Mr Caldwell's act endangered life. T o convict them of the 
offences with which they were charged, however, the prosecution had to 
prove not only that they did acts which had such actual consequences, but 
also that they acted with the mens rea required for those offences: that 
Mrs Hyam intended to cause death or serious injury; that Mr Caldwell 
intended to endanger life or was reckless as to whether life would be 
endangered. 
Jurists commonly analyse criminal offences into the two elements of 
actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus consists in the 'external elements' 
(elements external to the defendant's mind) of the offence; it typically 
involves an 'act' by the defendant together with certain specified circum-
stances and consequences. The mens rea, or 'menta! element', consists in 
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the 'state of mind' (normally intention or recklessness) in relation to that 
actus reus which must be proved to secure a conviction. The actus reus of 
murder is the killing (an act which has as a consequence the death) of a 
human being; its mens rea is an intention to cause death or serious injury. 
The actus reus of rape is unlawful sexual intercourse with a non-consenting 
woman (an act of intercourse a circumstance of which is that the woman 
does not consent to it); its mens rea is (apart from the intention to have 
intercourse) knowledge that she does not consent or recklessness as to her 
consent. The actus reus of an offence under s. 1(1) of the Criminal Damage 
Act is an act which destroys or damages another's property; its mens rea is 
an intention to destroy or damage such property, or recklessness as to 
whether i t is destroyed or damaged. 5 
. A defendant is guilty of a criminal offence only if he committed its actus 
reus with the appropriate mens rea: he can avoid conviction by admitting 
that he actualiy committed the actus reus of the offence (he caused death; 
he had intercourse with a non-consenting woman), but offering an excuse 
which shows that he lacked the requisite mens rea (he did not intend ot 
expect to cause death or injury; he thought that the woman consented). As 
in the criminallaw, so with morality. The fact that I give you information 
which is actually false does not by itself entitle you to condemn me as a 
liar. Y ou must ask whether I knew the information to be false an d whether 
I intended to deceive you; and I can avoid being branded a liar by offering 
an excuse which denies the 'menta! element' in lying: that I believed the 
information to be true and did not intend to deceive you. 
Our concern is with the 'menta! element in crime' and with the role 
played by the concepts of intention and recklessness in defìning that menta! 
element. 
The 1985 Draft Criminal Code for English law specifìed a 'generai 
requirement of fault'. 'Unless a contrary intention appears, a person does 
no t commi t a Code offence unless h e acts intentionaliy, knowingly or 
recklessly in respect of each of its elements' (cl. 24(1 )). (The revised 1989 
Draft Code includes a similar requirement (cl. 20).)6 This clause would give 
statutory force to the principle that criminal guilt requires mens rea (a 
5 See S&H, eh. 4; TCL, eh. 3.1; C&K, eh. 2.1-III; E&W, ehs 2-3; A.T.H. Smith, 
'On actus reus and mens rea'. 
6 As part of the Law Commission's projeet of eodifying English eriminallaw, a 
team of aeademie lawyers produced a Draft Criminal Code, whieh was published 
with a eommentary in 1985; Codification of the Criminal Law (referred to hereafter 
as 1985 Code). After eonsidering eomments on the 1985 Code, the Law Commis-
sion published its own revised Draft Criminal Code in 1989; A Criminal Code for 
England and Wales (referred to hereafter as 1989 Code). 
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'fault element'), conststmg in intention, knowledge or recklessness, as to 
every element of the actus reus of the relevant offence; that principle 
should bind the courts unless the legislature makes clear that no such fault 
element is required. 
As a description of the actuallaw, this principle is far from exceptionless. 
Though most (and especialiy the most serious) offences require intention 
or recklessness, some need involve only negligence: manslaughter can, 
perhaps, be committed by gross negligence (S&H, pp. 352-5); one who 
drives 'without due care and attention' commits an offence of negligence 
(Road Traffìc Act 1988, s. 3), as do employers who fai! to 'ensure, as far as 
is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work' of their 
employees (Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, s. 2(1)) . 
Nor is mens rea always required as to every element of the actus reus: 
a man over the age of twenty-four who has sexual intercourse with a giri 
under the age of sixteen is guilty of an offence even if he neither knows nor 
has reason to suspect that she is under sixteen (Sexual Offences Act 1956, 
s. 6); a shopkeeper can be guilty of the offence of seliing adulterateci milk 
even if she did not suspect that the milk was adulterateci and had taken ali 
reasonable care to ensure that it was not adulterateci (Sale of Food and 
Drugs Act 1875, s. 6; see Food and Drugs Act 1955, ss. 32, 94(4), 113). 
Liability for su eh offences is to some degree 'strict'; they do no t require 
any of the norma! 'fault elements' of intention, recklessness or even negli-
gence as to one or more of the elements of the actus reus. 7 
As a claim about what the law ought to be, however, the principle 
commands wide support. It is surely unjust to hold someone strictly liable 
for a criminal act he did not commit intentionaliy, recklessly or negligent-
ly: for selling adulterateci milk when he had taken ali due care to ensure 
that the milk was pure; or for having sexual intercourse with a giri whom 
he believed, with good reason, to be over sixteen. And negligence is surely 
a much less serious fault than intenti o n or recklessness; the more serious 
kinds of offence, at least, should require intention or recklessness. (In what 
follows, I wili be concerned primarily with serious offences against person 
or property, such as murder, rape, wounding, assault, theft and criminal 
damage: for it is to these that the maxim 'actus non facit reum nisi mens sit 
rea' applies most forcefuliy. Although I think myself that crimina/liability 
should always require at least negligence, I shali not discuss the issue of 
whether there are some 'statutory' offences (to do, for instance, with 
pollution and with consumer protection) for which strict liability may be 
permissible.) 
7 On striet liability, see S&H, eh. 6; C&K, pp. 173-90; E&W, eh. 3.6. 
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The Draft Criminal Codes also specify a hierarchy of 'degrees of fault', 
which marks intention (or knowledge) as the highest degree of fau!t, 
followed by recklessness (198 5 Code, cl. 23; 1989 Code, cl. 19); this 
expresses the principle that intention is the most serious kind of criminal 
fault. There are indeed some offences, such as murder and criminal 
attempts, for which recklessness alone is not sufficient; an appropriate 
intention (to kill or cause serious injury; to commit the complete offence) 
is needed. In some cases, too, the law distinguishes a more serious offence 
involving intention from a !esser offence of recklessness: while murder in 
English law requires intention, the !esser offence of manslaughter need 
involve only recklessness; an d the Offences against the Perso n Act 1861 
distinguishes the simple s. 20 offence of wounding, which can be commit-
ted either intentionally or recklessly, from the more serious s. 18 offence of 
wounding 'with intent to do some grievous bodily harm'. Even when an 
offence c an be committed, as many c an, either intentionally or recklessly, 
the most serious instances of the offence will involve intention: I commit 
an offence un der s. l (l) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 if I destroy 
another's property either intentionally or recklessly; but an act of inten-
tional destruction is the paradigm, and most serious, instance of this 
offence. 
As in the criminallaw, so with morality. If I give you false information, 
you can properly criticize me only if my action was at least negligent. If I 
mislead you negligently, through failing to notice or guard against the risk 
that what I say is false, I am to some degree culpable: but my offence is 
surely worse if I mislead you recklessly, by telling you w ha t I know might 
well be false; and I am yet more seriously culpable if I intentionally or 
knowingly deceive you, by saying what is designed to deceive you or what 
I know will deceive you. 
But it is not enough just to note that intention and recklessness are 
typically taken to be the centrai species of criminal fau!t, and that intention 
is typically thought to be the most serious kind of fault; we must explain 
why this should be so. 
Why, first, should criminal gui!t require mens rea a t all? Mr Caldwell 
did, after all, damage property and endanger life; Mrs Hyam did cause two 
deaths. Each thus brought about a kind of harm which the criminal law 
presumably aims to prevent, and which is specified in the definition of the 
actus reus of the offence with which each was charged: so why should they 
not be convicted of those offences, whatever their intentions or states of 
mind? Why, more generally, should an agent not be convicted of a criminal 
offence just so long as what she did amounted to the actus reus of an 
offence - whether or not she intended to commit that actus reus or realized 
that she was or might be committing it? Why should various typical 
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excuses, which deny intention or recklessness as to the actual consequences 
of my actions ('I didn't mean to do it'; 'It was an accident'; 'lt ~a: a 
mistake'; 'I didn't realize that that might happen') exempt me from cnmm-
al liability; why should no t ali offences be offences of strict liability? 
Why, secondly, should intention and recklessness bt so crucial to _cri-
minai liability? Even if some kind of 'fault' should generally be reqUired 
for a criminal offence, why should negligence not suffice; why should we 
not convict of an offence anyone who negligently causes a harm which the 
law aims to prevent (convict of wounding anyone who negligently wounds 
another), rather than convicting only those who commit the actus reus 
intentionally or recklessly? 
Why, thirdly, should intention sometimes be distinguished from reck-
lessness, as a categorially more serious kind of fau!t? For some offences 
either intention or recklessness suffices as the mens rea: why should others 
require intention rather than recklessness? 
An attempt to work towards answers to these questions, and to the 
questions raised by the four cases with which this chapter began, can best 
be founded on a discussion of the centrai concepts of intention and reck-
lessness: for in seeing what these concepts c an, or should, me an we shall 
also see why they should pay such a centrai role in the criminal law. 
Recklessness will be discussed in P art II; I shall be gin with intenti o n. 
